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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 19/04/2006

Accident number: 60

Accident time: 11:25

Accident Date: 25/02/1997

Where it occurred: Bela Vista, Bie
Province

Country: Angola

Primary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)

Class: Missed-mine accident
ID original source: HM/GP/MP - H242

Date of main report: 03/03/1997
Name of source: INAROEE

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: PPM-2 AP blast

Ground condition: pylons and surrounds

Date record created: 23/01/2004

Date last modified: 23/01/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 2

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: Chinguar

Map series:

Map edition: Folha 257

Map sheet:

Map name: 1:100 000

Accident Notes
inadequate equipment (?)
inadequate medical provision (?)
handtool may have increased injury (?)
inadequate area marking (?)
visor not worn or worn raised (?)
safety distances ignored (?)
inadequate training (?)

Accident report
The demining group used a two-man team and a one-man drill at the site. In this the same
deminer cuts undergrowth, excavates and uses the detector.
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An investigation, dated 3rd March 1997, was made by the country MAC and its report was
found on file. The following summarises its content.
The report stated that the demining task was a series of pylons and a bridge. Teams of two
deminers per pylon were clearing a 10 metre square area around the base. When the board
of inquiry visited the site on 1st March, demining was in progress around other pylons and
they ordered it to stop immediately. The inquiry criticised the fact that the site had been tidied
before their arrival. The were told that the victim had located two mines that day prior to the
accident. These were destroyed and the victim was checking the blast area with his detector
when he got another reading. The reading was in front of a partly exposed mine. The victim
seemed to be "concerned with the (exposed) mine". He was wearing his protective equipment
"correctly" but started to excavate the partly exposed mine without prodding the new reading
first. At 11:25 the hidden mine detonated. The victim was "less than 50cm" from the
detonation.
Fragments were found in the deminer's vest but none had penetrated. The blast injuries to the
face did not include fragments, which the team thought implied that the visor had given some
protection. [A photo of the visor is included, severely distorted and sooted - with the damage
apparently on the inside.]
At 13:05 the victim arrived at a field hospital and at Luanda Hospital at 18:00. The country
MAC amended the demining group's plan to take the deminer to a private hospital, which may
have contributed to the delay and was criticised by the investigators.

Conclusion
The investigating team decided that the deminer's negligence, failures of supervision and the
"unorthodox method of clearance at the site" all contributed to the accident. It was further
stated that "insufficient detail" in the SOPs was a factor. The unorthodox methods used at the
site included using unpainted and irregularly spaced sticks that were not in a straight line and
marking a detector reading with grass. The demining group's published methods were not
used. Just before the accident the supervisor destroyed two mines in the victim's lane. These
were spaced so that the deminer went past one to detect the other. This was deemed
"inherently unsafe" by the investigators. Another deminer was working only 5m from the
victim, which they also observed was unsafe.

Recommendations
The inquiry recommended that training be modified and SOPs amended. They said that the
victim's team should be retrained, concentrating on marking procedures and the use of a front
of lane marker. The supervisors should "re-familiarise themselves with the SOP". They
decreed that clearance must be suspended until the re-training was completed and required
the demining group to revise their SOPs. They also recommended that the Angola MAC
expedite the standardisation of Angolan Operating Procedures and assess the other demining
sites controlled by this group.

Victim Report
Victim number: 82

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: DECEASED

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: 6 hours 35 minutes

Protection issued: Long visor

Protection used: Short frontal vest

Short frontal vest
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Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
severe Eyes
severe Face
severe Hand
AMPUTATION/LOSS
Finger
FATAL
COMMENT
No medical report was made available. The victim died three days after the accident.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Management/control inadequacy" because
the demining group's SOPs were not followed by the field supervisors. Their inadequate field
management (including an expatriate "expert") appears to illustrate a failing of management
at country level within the demining group. The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate
training”.
The victim's injuries were unusually severe. Although the unacceptable time-lapse between
the accident and treatment may have contributed to the fatality, these records include several
where deminers have initiated blast mines more than twice the size of this one without
adequate facial protection and have not died.
It seems likely that the victim was working with his visor raised and leaning forward over the
top of the mine that detonated. The injuries are not detailed, but throat and neck injuries seem
most likely. It is likely that the victim's handtool (or parts of it) struck the victim's neck, causing
the severe injuries (see Related papers).

Related papers
The demining group produced an internal investigation report which was made available. This
report indicated that a second mine detonated "sympathetically" when the first initiated. The
second mine was 40cm away. The report stated that the victim's "visor was destroyed,
probably by the impact of his trowel", noting that the visor did not protect him from the blast.
The report acknowledged that a "standard pattern" of clearance for confined areas would
"help avoid the practice of mine-hunting".
A letter from the Angola MAC to the demining group (dated simply March 1997) pointed out
that in the accident reports of 3rd March 1997, 19th November 1996 and 3rd July 1996 "the
same points were raised" with regard to inadequate supervision. That letter demanded that
the Angolan Supervisor and the senior expatriate Supervisor in charge when this accident
occurred "should not be permitted to continue working in demining operations in Angola".
A letter from the demining group to the Angola MAC confirmed that retraining was under way
and invited observation. It also stated that the supervisor would only be used as an interpreter
in future. The fate of the expatriate senior supervisor was not mentioned.
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